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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter takes a look at the effect of media on public knowledge, studying the knowl­
edge on the candidates' issue stands and endorsements, and then introducing the con­
cept of the Gas Tax Holiday. It also discusses the effects of partisan media and selective 
avoidance, along with the informing effect of the Internet.
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THE founders of the United States of America considered the freedom of the press so im­
portant that they enshrined its protection in the First Amendment. The reason was sim­
ple. “[To] the press alone, chequered as it is with abuses,” wrote James Madison, “the 
world is indebted for all the triumphs which have been gained by reason and humanity, 
over errors and oppression” (Madison 1799).
The role of the press in preserving democracy is based on the fact that most of us experi­
ence politics in digested mediated form. For a body politic populated with individuals pre­
occupied with earning a living, schooling, raising a family, spending time with friends, 
and the many demands of life, the press acts as a surrogate. In that role, it flags salient 
topics and communicates relevant information in palatable form. When the press does not 
focus on such important matters as the escalating presence of the US in Vietnam in 1964, 
the vulnerabilities of the Savings and Loan industry in 1988, the January 2001 warnings 
of the Hart–Rudman Commission about the probability of a terrorist attack on US soil, or 
the realities underlying the US war in Afghanistan in 2008, the process breaks down.
The press is often viewed as an institution of democracy or the fourth branch of govern­
ment (Cater 1959). Although a free press is the idealized norm, it is not completely inde­
pendent from the government as they rely on each other. Government actors depend on 
the news media to communicate with their constituents and the press relies on the three 
branches of the government for support from postal subsidies, development of new tech­
nologies, and protection of intellectual property. “The news media are an intermediary in­
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stitution in Washington, DC, and a crucial one in a separation‐of‐powers system where ac­
tion does not come easily” (Cook 2005, 164).
(p. 237) Although, the news media serve as the conduit between the public and govern­
ment and are often indicted for their shortcomings, their failure in informing the public is 
sometimes the outcome of the journalistic norm to legitimize stories with official sources. 
Journalists “grant government officials a privileged voice in the news” and omit voices 
that are extreme or fall outside of the “official news gate” (Bennett 1990, 104, 106). Ac­
cording to scholar W. Lance Bennett, from the beat to the boardroom the press “indexes” 
the official debate (1990). If there is no official debate among “legitimate” voices, there 
will be little coverage found in mainstream news. Therefore, a failure of the press in alert­
ing the public can be seen as a failure of public officials to stir debate.
What democracy requires is that the press wrangle with topics requiring deliberation, 
hold those who lead accountable, and communicate accurate information about national 
affairs in a venue hospitable to debate and the evaluation of alternatives. In a system of 
government such as ours, this function is a central one because, as Herbert Gans wrote, 
“The country's democracy may belong directly or indirectly to its citizens, but the democ­
ratic process can only be truly meaningful if these citizens are informed” (Gans 2003, 1).
Since US citizens vote for candidates and not policy positions, understanding candidates' 
stands on issues matters. During presidential elections, we should expect that those who 
pay reasonable attention to news in its various incarnations will grasp, if not command, 
the areas of candidate agreement and disagreement. Unsurprisingly, policy preferences 
influence how people vote (Page and Jones 1979). While the causal direction between em­
brace of an issue agenda and vote choice is disputed, the fact that they covary is not 
(Brody and Page 1972).
Although the amount of knowledge voters have about the political system and the issues 
being disputed in elections fails to satisfy a high ideal (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), 
confusion about candidates' position on issues is not inevitably the fault of the voters. If 
the media do not cover an issue or do so in ways that minimize learning, then voters must 
search out the details on their own. The advent of the Internet increases their capacity to 
do so while at the same time raising the possibility that they will fall prey to misinforma­
tion compatible with their ideological dispositions.
Scholars have found that “[although] the possession of ‘facts’ is related to citizens' media 
exposure, the correlation is weak, particularly in the case of television news. And once 
one controls for education level, the correlation nearly disappears” (Patterson and Seib 
2005, 191). Exposure to local news actually predicts a drop in political knowledge 
(Jamieson and Hardy 2007; Prior 2003). Newspaper readership, however, has traditional­
ly been a reliably positive predictor (Becker and Dunwoody 1982; Chaffee and Frank 
1996, 48–58; Chaffee, Zhao, and Leshner 1994). So, too, is the use of the Internet to lo­
cate political information (Hardy, Jamieson, and Winneg 2008).
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The changed media landscape calls into question findings gathered in an age when news­
paper readership was more widespread, when broadcast television news, not cable opin­
ion talk, was the audiovisual form in which most Americans got their political information 
and the Internet was a gleam in the eyes of a handful of defense contractors and schol­
ars. In October 2008 a Pew survey (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2008) 
found that television, a category that included cable, was the main source of news for 72 
percent of respondents, an increase of 2 percent from 2000. Radio was also a more im­
portant source with 21 percent saying that they “got most of their news about the presi­
dential campaign” from that source in 2008 compared with 15 percent who gave the 
same answer eight years earlier. Reliance on the Internet had tripled with 11 percent 
turning to it during the Bush–Gore contest and 33 percent reporting the same during the 
Obama–McCain campaign (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2008).
In light of the past importance of newspapers as a source of accurate information, its 
drop in readership raises the question we address here. In this changed media world, 
what is the relationship between media use and command of information useful in casting 
an informed vote? Some believe that the electorate needs to understand the actual dis­
tinctions between candidates. Others hold that shorthand methods are generally reliable 
and hence desirable in the absence of deeper knowledge. Here we ask how well the me­
dia inform about each before turning to an examination of whether, and if so how, public 
knowledge has been affected by two changes in the media terrain: the use of the remote 
control in a multichannel world and the advent of partisan media. We begin by examining 
the relation between media use and issue knowledge and then focus on two more tele­
graphic forms of information: knowledge of endorsements and awareness of elite consen­
sus.
Overall, the altered landscape has not produced a citizenry dramatically more or less in­
formed that it was two decades ago. “On average, today's citizens are about as able to 
name their leaders, and are about as aware of major news events, as was the public near­
ly 20 years ago,” reported a Pew survey in 2007 (Pew Research Center for the People & 
the Press 2007). That study included “nine questions that are either identical or roughly 
comparable to questions asked in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 2007 somewhat few­
er were able to name their governor, the vice president, and the president of Russia, but 
more respondents than in the earlier era gave correct answers to questions pertaining to 
national politics” (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2007).
Knowledge of Issue Stands of Candidates
Historically, both heading news and watching debates predicts issue knowledge. In 2004 
debate‐watching and newspaper‐reading predicted knowing the answers to three central 
questions about the general election candidates' positions on issues (Jamieson and Kenski
2006). Even when education and party identification were controlled, watching a debate 
significantly increased a citizen's odds of knowing that Kerry was the candidate who fa­
vored reimporting drugs from Canada and favored eliminating tax breaks for overseas 
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profits of American corporations and using the money to cut taxes for businesses that cre­
ate jobs in the United States, and that Bush was the candidate (p. 239) who favored allow­
ing workers to invest some of their Social Security contributions in the stock market. Al­
though both were significant, the effect of debate watching on knowledge was stronger 
than that of newspaper reading.
Evidence from the 2000 National Annenberg Election Study (NAES), however, suggests 
that media commentary about an event can shape perceptions that differ from those one 
would hold as a result of actually watching the debate. After the first debate of 2000, as­
sessments of Democratic nominee Al Gore's honesty dropped not among those who actu­
ally watched the debate but among those who obtained their information about it from 
media commentary that focused on putative exaggerations (Erikson 1976; Hollander 
1979; Krebs 1998).
Knowledge of Endorsements
Media exposure also plays a role in informing the public about who supports whom, a 
form of knowledge that permits voters to draw inferences about the candidates' ideologi­
cal dispositions or stands on the issues. Endorsements are a useful low‐information 
means of deducing candidate ideology and issue stands. Studies of the effects of newspa­
per endorsements have produced mixed results. Some have found that they may influ­
ence up to 5 percent of the vote (Erikson 1976; Hollander 1979; Krebs 1998). Others con­
clude that newspaper endorsements have little (Hagen and Jamieson 2000) or no effect at 
all on vote (Hurd and Singletary 1984; Counts 1985) or only an effect on those less en­
gaged in politics. However, some recent studies of the role of endorsements in the nomi­
nating process found significant effects. One that examined “all publicly reported en­
dorsements in a broad range of publications” concluded that “trial‐heat” (head‐to‐head) 
poll results and endorsements “are almost equally important predictors of primary 
outcomes” (Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller 2003, 36). A second concluded that such polls 
and endorsements significantly predict votes in both parties during the primaries (Steger 
2007). Endorsements by groups and unions have been shown to drum up enthusiasm 
among their members (Gimpel 1998), and when an organization or group stands with a 
candidate, its members are more likely to embrace the endorsee (Burns, Francia, and 
Herrnson 2000; Rapoport, Stone, and Abramowitz 1991). The effects of endorsements 
should be more pronounced in primary campaigns in which voters confront candidates 
about whom they know comparatively little (Kennamer and Chaffee 1982). In intra‐party 
contests, political communication has a unique opportunity to influence independents and 
party identifiers alike. These effects of course assume that the public knows who en­
dorsed whom, an assumption that raises the question “how does the public obtain that in­
formation?”
Data from the 2008 NAES collected during the primary season show that news media 
consumption was significantly related to knowledge of endorsements (Jamieson and 
Hardy 2009). The relationship between reported television use and knowledge of endorse­
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ments was particularly strong for the endorsements that a majority of respondents could 
identify correctly. For example, we found that 79.2 percent of respondents (p. 240) knew 
that Oprah Winfrey supported Senator Obama and that television information seeking 
was positively related to knowledge of this endorsement. Similar relationships existed for 
knowledge of Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy and New Mexico Governor Bill 
Richardson's endorsements of Obama. More than half of respondents were familiar with 
each, and television news use, newspaper reading, and Internet use were all significantly 
and positively related to recalling that information.
The New York Times endorsements of Senators Hillary Clinton and John McCain were not 
as well known as those by Oprah Winfrey, Senator Kennedy, and Governor Richardson. 
Yet the three news media‐use variables—television, newspaper, and Internet—were signif­
icantly and positively related to knowing the names of the candidates endorsed by the 
Times. Media use also predicted awareness of Senator Joe Lieberman's support for Mc­
Cain, Dr James Dobson's for Huckabee, the United Farm Workers' for Clinton, and 
MoveOn.org's for Obama. By increasing voter knowledge of endorsements, media provide 
low‐information voters in particular with a form of useful information.
Since the findings are drawn from survey data, strict causal inferences about the impact 
of news media on knowledge of endorsements are problematic. However, the relation­
ships between news consumption and knowledge of endorsement, reported here, hold in 
the face of controls such as age, gender, race, education, and ideology, which allows us to 
be more confident in the relationships (Jamieson and Hardy 2009).
When Consensus is Clear and Communicated 
by Media it Creates an Effect: The Gas Tax Hol­
iday
Elite consensus functions in much the same way as endorsements. For those who trust it, 
it minimizes the need for additional information seeking. One set of exchanges in 2008 
provided a particularly apt test of the role of media in transmitting elite consensus.
As the last Form 1040s were attached to tax forms on April 15, the presumptive Republi­
can nominee tried to harness his campaign to the news agenda by advocating suspending 
the federal excise tax on gasoline from Memorial Day to Labor Day. By the end of the 
month, Democratic contender Hillary Clinton, who remained locked in a tight contest 
with Barack Obama, was championing the same idea. If, as lay logic but not economic 
theory suggested, the reduction in the gas tax meant lower prices for consumers, the 
move would reduce the cost per gallon of gas by the amount of the tax, about 18.4 cents 
for regular unleaded and 24.4 cents for diesel.
Barack Obama opposed the gas holiday as insistently as McCain and Clinton favored it. In 
taking the no‐tax‐holiday position, the Illinois Democrat was on the side of most econo­
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mists. Indeed, when pressed, Senator Clinton could not name a single one of that elite 
class who considered the tax holiday a good idea (ABC News 2008).
(p. 241) On the suspension, the views of economists were clear. “More than 200 econo­
mists, including four Nobel Prize winners, signed a letter rejecting proposals by presiden­
tial candidates Hillary Clinton and John McCain to offer a summertime gas‐tax holiday,” 
noted Brian Faler writing for Bloomberg.com. Opposition crossed party lines:
Columbia University economist Joseph Stiglitz, former Congressional Budget Of­
fice Director Alice Rivlin and 2007 Nobel winner Roger Myerson are among those 
who signed the letter calling proposals to temporarily lift the tax a bad idea. An­
other is Richard Schmalensee of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who 
was a member of President George H. W. Bush's Council of Economic Advisers.…
“Suspending the federal tax on gasoline this summer is a bad idea, and we oppose 
it,” the letter says. Economist Henry Aaron of the Brookings Institution is among 
those circulating the letter. Aaron said that while he supports Obama, the list in­
cludes Republicans and Clinton supporters. (Faler 2008)
Rather than taking on the economists, Senators McCain and Clinton dismissed their 
views. “I find people who are the wealthiest who are most dismissive of a plan to give 
low‐income Americans a little holiday…Thirty dollars mean nothing to a lot of economists
—I understand that. It means a lot to some low‐income Americans,” Senator McCain re­
sponded. When pressed by host George Stephanopoulos on ABC's May 4 This Week to 
name an economist who supported the gas tax holiday, Clinton responded, “I'm not going 
to put my lot in with economists.”
Included in this controversy were disagreements among political elites (Senator Obama 
versus Senator Clinton and Senator McCain), intra‐party contention (Senator Clinton ver­
sus Senator Obama), inter‐party contest (Senator Obama versus Senator McCain), and a 
clash between expert and political elite opinion (Senators McCain and Clinton versus the 
economists). Put these factors together and you have a test of the scholarly consensus 
that: (1) expert opinion can influence public opinion; (2) citizens use elite cues to form 
opinions, with the most politically attentive individuals adopting elite opinion; and (3) 
elite opinion has the greatest impact on public opinion when there is a consensus among 
elites (Brody 1991; Darmofal 2005; Yin 1999; Zaller 1992).1
According to the 2008 NAES, media use was significantly related to knowledge of the po­
sition of the three candidates (Clinton, McCain, and Obama) on the gas tax holiday.2 All 
four of our news media variables—television, talk radio, newspaper, and Internet—were 
positively related to knowledge of the candidates' stances.3 Consistent with past (p. 242)
scholarship, 2008 NAES data suggest that the public accepted elite economic opinion and 
with it the Obama view of the gas tax holiday. The effect of media in priming the elite cue 
is apparent as television, newspaper, and Internet positively and significantly predicted 
the belief that gas tax is a bad idea. The media relationships held in the face of controls 
and after including knowledge of Obama's stance on the gas tax holiday in the model, 
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which produced a significant and positive relationship with the belief that the gas tax hol­
iday is a bad idea.
We turn next to three changes in the media environment that have affected what people 
know about politics by altering how they know it. First, we examine the impact of use of 
the remote control during news viewing; then we turn to an examination of the effects of 
partisan media on what people know, and close with a discussion on the effect of the In­
ternet and viral email.
Effects of Use of the Remote Control
The few studies examining channel changing and news content (Morris and Forgette 
2007; Walker, Bellamy, and Traudt 1993) used selective avoidance as the theoretical basis 
explaining motivation for using the remote control during news programs. Past studies 
have found that 36.5 percent to 59.4 percent of viewers often changed channels to avoid 
politicians and political ads that they did not like or did not agree with and changed the 
channel to avoid a news story that they did not like (Walker, Bellamy, and Traudt 1993). 
Data from a 2004 study conducted by the Pew Research Center found that 62 percent of 
the public agreed with the statement “I find that I often watch the news with my remote 
control in hand, flipping to other channels when I'm not interested” (Pew Research Cen­
ter for the People & the Press 2004; Morris and Forgette 2007).
These studies focus on shifts from news to non‐news content and found this news grazing 
to be negatively related to levels of political knowledge and positively related to cynicism 
(Morris and Forgette 2007). Here we are concerned instead with the viewer who switches 
from one news program to another mid‐program.
There is debate over the level of involvement tied to remote control use (Ferguson and 
Perse 1993; Wang, Busemeyer, and Lang 2006). Some see channel changing as the behav­
ior of an active viewer who is routinely evaluating what she or he is watching and making 
selections to satisfy certain needs (Walker and Bellamy 1991). Others believe that chan­
nel changing is an activity characteristic of the detached and uninvolved viewer, the one 
nonchalantly “surfing” the channels. A recent study harmonizes these views by suggest­
ing that active and passive viewers reflect different patterns of cognitive effort in pro­
cessing (Lang et al. 2005) and that remote control use can be active or passive depending 
on the specific situation. Regardless of level of cognitive involvement in switching chan­
nels, we add the reminder that being exposed to multiple and diverse points of views 
leads to greater acquisition of political knowledge (Scheufele et al. 2004, 2006).
(p. 243) Whatever the effect, according to NAES data collected between August 1 and No­
vember 3, 2008, surfing among news channels is common behavior. To identify channel 
shifters we first asked: “Thinking now about the past week how many days did you see in­
formation on broadcast or cable television about the 2008 presidential campaign? This in­
cludes seeing programs on television, on the internet, your cellphone, iPod, or PDA.” Just 
over 46 percent (46.6 percent—17,711 respondents) who said that they watched televi­
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sion news reported such switching among news programs. This level is similar to the 
numbers found in past research on overall levels of channel changing during any given 
program (Bellamy and Walker 1996). We find that the positive relationship between chan­
nel switching and knowledge of candidate issues stances becomes more robust the more 
times one switches among programs. These results hold in the presence of stringent con­
trols such as level of education, overall news media use, and interest in the 2008 presi­
dential election.
The Effects of Partisan Media
Conservative radio and cable were influencing large audiences before their explicitly par­
tisan liberal counterparts, Air America and MSNBC's Countdown with Keith Olbermann
and Rachel Maddow show, launched. Rush Limbaugh made his national debut in 1988; 
Fox News entered the scene eight years later. In 2010 Talkers Magazine put Limbaugh's 
audience at 15 million and his fellow conservative Sean Hannity's audience at 14 million 
(Talkers Magazine 2010). A 2004 Pew Center survey found that 22 percent of those in the 
US get most of their news from Fox. Of those, 46 percent self‐identify as conservatives, 
32 percent as moderates (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2004).
The presence of explicitly ideological media expanded the public's range of choices and in 
the process opened the possibility that conservatives would seek out reinforcing informa­
tion on conservative outlets and liberals would do the same on the other side. Relying on 
Nielsen's people meter data across sixty‐two prominent television networks in the first 
week of February 2003, media scholar James Webster (2005) found modest evidence of 
polarization, defined as “the tendency of channel audiences to be composed of devotees 
and nonviewers.” Importantly, Webster's analysis of Fox viewers concluded that “even the 
audience for FOX News…spends 92.5% of its time watching something else on television. 
The rest of their time is widely distributed across the channels they have 
available” (Webster 2005, 366, 380). “Of course,” he adds, “it may be that even a little ex­
posure to certain materials has big social effects, but if these viewers live in cloistered 
communities, they evidently spend a good deal of time out and about” (Webster 2005, 
380). The limitation of analysis by cable network for our purposes is, of course, that 
where we posit a pattern of reinforcement in exposure to news and opinion talk, these da­
ta include both entertainment and non‐entertainment programming.
(p. 244) Drawing on Webster's analysis of Nielsen data, political scientist Marcus Prior 
narrowed the field to focus simply on cable content on networks that program news and 
opinion talk and notes that “those who watched at least some Fox News spent 7.5% of 
their overall viewing time with the Fox News Channel, but another 6% with the other four 
cable networks” (CNN, CNN Headline News, CNBC, MSNBC). After analyzing these pat­
terns, he concludes the data “offer little support for claims that the fragmentation of the 
cable news environment fosters political polarization by encouraging selective exposure 
to only one side of an issue” (Prior 2007, 157–8).
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Relying on data from the Pew Research Center's 1998 to 2004 Biennial Media Consump­
tion Survey to identify factors predicting exposure to cable and nightly news, Jonathan 
Morris finds that the audiences for Fox and CNN are becoming increasingly polarized, 
with Fox viewers less likely than CNN viewers to watch accounts critical of the Bush ad­
ministration and more likely than non‐watchers to underestimate the number of Ameri­
cans killed in the Iraq War. The study found that “the Fox News audience prefers news 
that shares their own point of view on politics and issues, while CNN and network news 
watchers do not” (Morris 2005, 56–79). Similarly, Jamieson and Cappella found that Fox 
viewers and Limbaugh listeners are more likely than other conservatives to reside in a 
world in which their view of challenged facts coincided with those of their party 
(Jamieson and Cappella 2008). The same was true on the other side. CNN's viewers were 
more likely to accept the liberal view of contested claims.
The process by which this occurs was on display in the Republican primaries of 2008. On 
his radio show, Rush Limbaugh regularly argued against the candidacies of Senator John 
McCain and former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee and tepidly endorsed former 
Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney. During the period between the New Hampshire 
primary (January 8, 2008) and Super Tuesday (February 5, 2008), Limbaugh strongly at­
tacked McCain's conservative credentials. Those assaults coincided with listeners' per­
ception of McCain, and those who listened to the talk show host were more likely than the 
non‐listening population—including those who describe themselves as conservatives—to 
believe that McCain was a moderate. The importance of this finding is magnified by its 
unexpectedness. Limbaugh had vigorously opposed McCain's bid for the Republican nom­
ination in 2000 and reiterated his disdain for the Arizona Republican in the years be­
tween 2000 and 2008. In other words, one would have assumed that any effect Limbaugh 
could have on his listeners had occurred long before he ratcheted up his anti‐McCain 
rhetoric during the 2008 primaries.
The conservative talk show host escalated his attacks on the Republican contender from 
Arizona in the days before and immediately after McCain's victory in the New Hampshire 
primary on January 8. As part of his arsenal, Limbaugh repeatedly reminded his listeners 
that the New York Times had endorsed McCain. Unsurprisingly we found that Limbaugh's 
listeners were more likely to know about the endorsement than conservatives not in his 
audience. Controlling for gender, race, education, party identification, and ideology, Lim­
baugh listeners were 3.94 times more likely than non‐listeners to know that the New York 
Times had endorsed the Arizona senator for the (p. 245) Republican nomination. The New 
York Times is a frequent object of Limbaugh's attack on the “liberal media.”
Controlling for sociopolitical demographic and news media use variables, we see that 
people's knowledge of McCain's endorsement by the liberal‐leaning New York Times 
editorial page did influence perceptions of McCain's ideological dispositions. Respon­
dents were asked to rate Senator McCain on a five‐point scale ranging from “very liberal” 
to “very conservative.” Those who knew about the New York Times endorsement were sig­
nificantly less likely to see McCain as a conservative.
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An across‐time analysis of 639 Limbaugh listeners and 8,077 non‐listeners surveyed by 
the 2008 NAES shows that Rush Limbaugh effectively defined John McCain for his listen­
ers. Before the New Hampshire primary about half of Limbaugh's listeners said McCain 
was a conservative. That number dropped almost 12 percentage points after McCain won 
in New Hampshire. After January 8, the number of Limbaugh listeners who said McCain 
was a liberal jumped 9 percentage points. During this period, the political perceptions of 
McCain among non‐Limbaugh listeners remained stable. An analysis of the differential 
impact of Limbaugh listening before and after the New Hampshire primaries indicated 
that Limbaugh had a significant impact on perceptions of McCain's ideological disposition 
only after the New Hampshire primary.
Immediately after the New Hampshire primary, Limbaugh listeners began to shift from 
their view that Senator McCain was a conservative. As mentioned above, strict causal 
claims should not be made. Additionally, any discussion on partisan media needs to take 
into account selection biases that may be at play as many people are likely to search out 
views that are in line with their own and don't expose themselves to diverse opinions. 
Therefore, attitudes, perceptions, and predispositions are likely to be simply reinforced. 
Yet, these results hold after controlling for gender, race, education, party identification, 
and respondents' own ideology, suggesting that partisan media have the capacity to in­
crease their audience's awareness of some types of information and to shape the 
audience's political attitudes (Jamieson and Hardy 2009).
Internet, Knowledge, and the Viral Brew
In 2004 we found that the Internet, in comparison with traditional press campaign cover­
age, has an informing effect similar to that of such major campaign events as conventions 
and debates (Hardy, Jamieson, and Winneg 2008). Following the 2004 general election, 
the Annenberg Public Policy Center conducted a survey of a random sample of 3,400 citi­
zens to assess the extent to which they believed the many claims made by, or on behalf of, 
the Bush and Kerry campaigns. In order to test the knowledge of forty‐one claims made 
by the major party campaigns in 2004, respondents rated the accuracy of the claims on a 
four‐point scale ranging from very truthful to not truthful (p. 246) at all. All claims were 
offered during the course of the campaign. All were checked for accuracy by 
FactCheck.org, a project of the Annenberg Public Policy Center, which Jamieson and 
Brooks Jackson direct. We found direct evidence that accessing campaign information on­
line significantly increases citizens' command of fact. We also found that the more respon­
dents believe that the candidates never told the truth in the 2004 election, the more likely 
they were to turn to the Internet to access campaign information. The cynical voter was 
likely to turn to the Internet to sort fact from fiction.
The information environment found online transforms the nature of access to the main­
stream in ways that increase the chance that using it will produce an effect in the offline 
world. At very little cost to the citizen, online one can read multiple newspapers and 
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check multiple news sites in very short order. Information is readily and cheaply accessi­
ble, unlike, for example, the cost of subscriptions to a handful of newspapers.
Although we find evidence that citizens can seek and find factual information online, the 
Internet also facilitates interpersonal communication that is not bounded spatially; this 
capacity can accelerate the spread of misinformation among citizens quickly through 
email, instant messaging, and chat rooms without any vetting in the process. There is an 
added dimension of source heuristics at play here. Receiving a forwarded email from a 
trusted friend or family member may increase the likelihood of adoption of the deceptive 
message. The source of the email becomes, in part, the source of the message.
During the 2008 campaign, deceptions spread throughout Internet, including claims that 
were not extensively discussed in mainstream news or found in candidate ads. One of the 
more prominent viral deceptive claims of the 2008 campaign suggested that Obama was 
a Muslim. This notion was reinforced by another viral claim stating that Obama could not 
be elected president because he violated the Constitutional requirement that the presi­
dent be a natural‐born citizen. In our post‐election deception survey we found that 19 
percent believed that Obama was a Muslim. In the presence of demographic, political ori­
entation, media‐use controls we found that those who said that they received negative 
emails about the candidates were more likely to believe Obama is a Muslim than those 
who did not receive such emails.
Conclusion
With the proliferation of channels, the Internet and viral email, the rise of explicitly parti­
san media, and the capacity to channel shift effortlessly across a medium with seven na­
tional channels of news and opinion talk, the media landscape has changed dramatically 
in recent decades. Although the current affairs knowledge of the public has not materially 
changed as a result, the sources of information contributing to that knowledge have be­
come more varied and the potential to reside in a self‐protective enclave of reinforcing in­
formation has risen as well.
(p. 247) As technological advances allow users to customize their news repertoire—
through the use of RSS feeds, customized home pages, DVRs, mobile devices, etc.…the 
concept of “mainstream news” will be relegated to the history books. As we have seen in 
advertising, marketing strategies are shifting away from wide‐ranging broadcast mes­
sages to focus on niche markets. With the rise of niche information markets, we are see­
ing the marketplace of ideas go through the same breakup. If these information markets 
subscribe to different journalistic norms, deliberation over a policy issue between groups 
may become more difficult as those coming to the table will have incompatible informa­
tion repertoires.
Future research on the effect of media on public knowledge will need to be highly target­
ed. No longer will scholars be able to rely on comparing types of media (i.e., newspaper 
versus television). As citizens now build their own media experiences, researchers will 
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need to focus on different communities in the social, not the geographic, sense. Informa­
tion, and misinformation, flow has become malleable via emails, postings on Facebook, 
and tweets on Twitter. Effects researchers will need to ask who sent what information to 
whom in what form through what channel. Like the concept of mainstream media, our 
scholarly assumptions about the nature and function of media will have to be rethought.
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Notes:
(1) Existing studies also suggest that: when elites are divided along party lines, the public 
becomes polarized; the influence of expert opinion on public opinion is reduced if there is 
disagreement between expert opinion and political elite opinion with the public following 
the lead of those whose ideology it shares; and citizens' level of disagreement with ex­
perts opinion is in part a function of personal attributes such as education, issue knowl­
edge, and personal experience with the issue.
(2) Exact question wording: “Which candidate or candidates running for president sup­
ports suspending the gas tax throughout the summer months this year? (1) Does John Mc­
Cain support it, or not? (2) Does Hillary Clinton support it, or not? [Deleted June 9, 2008] 
(3) Does Barack Obama support it, or not?”
(3) At the p < .001 level.
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